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The political distortions in public investment projects are investigated within a bipartisan 
framework. The role of scrapping and modifying projects of previous governments receives 
special attention. The ruling party overspends on large ideological public investment projects 
and accumulates too much debt to bind the hands of its successor, especially if the probability 
of being removed from office is large and the possibility of scrapping is not ruled out. These 
political distortions have implications for the appropriate format of a fiscal rule. A deficit rule, 
like the Stability and Growth Pact, mitigates the overspending bias in ideological investment 
projects and improves social welfare. The optimal second-best restriction on public debt 
exceeds the socially optimal level of public debt. Social welfare is boosted more by 
investment restrictions on ideological projects. The government then perceives a larger 
benefit of debt reduction. In fact, if scrapping is forbidden, optimal investment restrictions can 
yields the socially optimal outcome. Finally, debt and investment restrictions are not needed if 
investment projects only have a financial return. 
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1. Introduction 
The consensus view is that democracies are prone to excessive public deficits and debt levels. 
A popular explanation is based on the partisan political mechanism of Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990), where the government runs a deficit to leave fewer resources for a successor with 
potentially different preferences about public consumption.
1 Tabellini and Alesina (1990) 
derive similar results in a setting with voting about the budget (and its composition) and 
uncertainty about the future identity of the median voter. While these frameworks are based 
on politically motivated public consumption, in this paper we analyse deficits, debt and public 
spending allocations when political parties have partisan preferences about public investment. 
We believe that such differences are highly relevant in practice. By selecting their own pet 
projects, usually large, highly visible projects, politicians or their parties may be able to earn a 
lot of political credit. This is especially true for major infrastructure projects located in a 
geographical area represented by the politician (as is the case in the U.S.), but it is also true if 
different parts of the electorate have different preferences about the mode of transport (e.g., 
roads versus railways), energy provision (nuclear versus other types of power plants), etcetera. 
  We cast our analysis in a three-period framework with two rival political parties and 
two types of public investment projects that in principle can yield both financial returns and 
ideological returns. In contrast to the financial returns, the ideological returns on the two 
projects differ between the two parties. For example, one party may favour roads while the 
other party favours railways. Electoral uncertainty leads the governing party to overspend on 
its preferred investment project. In turn, this implies a deficit and debt bias. An important 
result of our paper is that the investment spending bias also produces a bias towards excessive 
current government spending, even though both parties have identical preferences towards 
public consumption (in contrast to the aforementioned papers). The logic is that the electoral 
uncertainty and, hence, the chance that resources will be spent in the future by a different 
government on an undesirable investment project, drives the current cost of public funds 
below the expected future cost of funds, leading not only to higher public investment, but also 
to higher current government consumption. This intertemporal political distortion in the 
dynamic efficiency condition for the optimal management of public debt is absent for public 
investment projects with pure financial returns and zero ideological returns. 
Our analytical framework thus extends the standard bipartisan model of the debt bias 
to allow for public investment with an ideological component. We also allow for possible 
                                                 
1 An alternative approach to explaining deficit and debt biases is based on a domestic common pool 
problem, where the minister of finance has insufficient credibility, no backing of the prime minister or 
lacks other institutional safeguards to resist the demands from the multitude of spending ministers and 
the pressure groups that push them (e.g., Von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995; Hallerberg and Von 
Hagen, 1999; Velasco, 1999, 2000; Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2006).   2
complementarity between the two types of public investment projects and we introduce the 
possibility that part of the first-period investment project can be scrapped in the second period. 
Complementarity introduces a direct effect of the partisan ideological divide over the projects 
on first-period investment. It tends to make the latter more attractive, because it raises the 
future financial returns on the other project in the second period. However, first-period 
investment is held back to the extent that it induces higher future investment in the other 
project for ideological reasons. 
With scrapping, the current cost of public funds is pushed further below the expected 
future cost of funds in the partisan outcome, implying an additional strategic reason for the 
current government to invest and borrow. Even when re-election is certain, there will now be 
excessive borrowing and overinvestment, ceteris paribus. These additional strategic reasons to 
invest too much can depress social welfare compared with the situation when scrapping is 
ruled out. Effectively, the incumbent government massively invests in its own pet project to 
discourage a future rival government from investing in its pet investment project. Once re-
election is ensured, the incumbent scraps a substantial part of its own project. Obviously, this 
additional strategic inefficiency does not enhance social welfare. 
While overspending on its own pet project is beneficial for the governing party given 
its chances of losing office, it is harmful for society at large. We consider deficit (or debt) and 
investment restrictions as possible ways to limit these social losses. Such restrictions are 
unnecessary if projects have only financial returns, since then the partisan and planner 
outcomes coincide. In the presence of ideological returns, however, these types of restrictions 
can bring the current cost of funds more in line with the expected future cost of funds, thereby 
weakening the strategic incentive for excessive borrowing. While a well-chosen deficit rule 
raises social welfare, we show that such a rule is dominated by appropriate restrictions on 
public investment. The reason is that the investment restriction is targeted at the origin of the 
distortions, namely the differences in the ideological valuation of the two investment projects 
by the two parties, while the debt restriction distorts the intra-temporal trade off between first-
period consumption and investment. Crucially, a restriction on (future) investment in 
ideological projects raises the current government’s perceived benefit of debt reduction, as the 
resources that are freed up for the future cannot be wasted on a project that yields no 
ideological return to this government. Debt will be thus lower and current ideological 
investment smaller. Moreover, less of the current investment will be scrapped in the future, 
while the time profile of government consumption is improved. In fact, if there is some rule to 
forbid scrapping and the incumbent thus knows ex ante that he cannot scrap, he will over-
invest less. Combined with investment restrictions, such a scrapping rule can bring the 
economy to the social optimum.   3
Our work is related to Peletier, Dur and Swank (1999). They introduce public 
investment within the model of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) with partisan government 
consumption and show that the introduction of a balanced budget rule crowds out public 
investment. Their point is that such a rule is inefficient and needs to be supplemented with a 
rule to guarantee the optimal level of public investment. Our approach is more closely related 
to interesting earlier work by Glazer (1989), who shows that rational voters exhibit a 
consistent bias in favour of building durable projects that they would oppose were the 
decision theirs alone to make. The mechanisms are similar. Since current voters cannot sign 
contracts with next period’s voters, the only way to limit future choices is to build durable 
projects. Apart from this commitment effect, there is also an efficiency effect. Voters might 
prefer to build a durable project now rather than no project and run the risk that next period a 
less efficient non-durable project is built. Although the work on the dynamic inefficiency of 
governments by Azzimonti-Renzo (2005) is concerned with disagreement about public 
consumption rather than investment, it should be mentioned as well. The struggle of short-
sighted groups that alternate in power leads to overspending on public consumption, 
underinvestment in public capital and lower growth. Public investment is strategically 
reduced to limit public capital available for tomorrow’s policymakers, who may have 
different preferences and are this way forced to spend less on their pet projects. 
Earlier justifications of deficit rules rely on a multi-country, bipartisan framework 
with a common pool problem for the issue of government debt as well as time inconsistency 
problems arising from the erosion of the real value of nominal government debt (Beetsma and 
Uhlig, 1999). Our analysis abstracts from monetary policy and inflation targets, and offers an 
alternative rationale for deficit rules based on the political economy of investment in a 
partisan framework (cf., Persson and Svensson, 1989, and Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). We 
abstract from money and central bank behaviour, but conjecture that our rationale holds even 
for a single country where the central bank pre-commits to pre-announced inflation targets. 
Section 2 discusses the apolitical outcome, which serves as our benchmark. Section 3 
sets up the main premises of our bipartisan framework of analysis. We characterise the 
political outcome and also offer some numerical results with respect to changes in crucial 
parameters such as the interest rate, the elasticity of demand for public consumption and the 
degree of polarisation of political preferences. We also explore how optimal debt 
management, public consumption and public investment respond to temporary and future 
changes in exogenous revenue. Section 4 contrasts the political and apolitical outcomes if 
governments can scrap past investment and a second-hand market for public capital exists. 
Section 5 analyses optimal second-best restrictions on public investment and government debt. 
In Section 6 we clarify the golden rule for government finance. Finally, Section 7 concludes.   4
 
2. Apolitical outcome in the absence of scrap 
To have a benchmark for comparison, we first characterise the apolitical outcome that 
prevails in the absence of elections. There are three periods and two possible investment 
projects K and L. These projects may yield both financial and ideological returns. The 
ideological returns are the non-financial or ideological benefits from the project and these are 
assumed to differ across members of the population. In particular, a fraction λ of the 
population favours investment project K, while a fraction 1-λ favours project L. Investment in 
project K, i.e., I, occurs in the first period and comes to fruition in the second period. 
Investment in project L, i.e., J, takes place in the second period and pays off in the third 
period. Investments in project K may benefit project L. 
The government is utilitarian and thus adds the preferences of its citizens and 
maximises the social welfare function presented in the first panel of Table 1 subject to the 
present-value budget constraint given in the second panel. We use italics to denote variables 
and roman capitals to indicate functions. Social welfare equals the discounted value of present 
and future government consumption, G1 and G2, plus the discounted value of the ideological 
return on investment in project K, i.e., I, and in project L, i.e., J. We assume separable 
preferences and set the social rate of discount to the market rate of interest φ = 1/(1+r). The 
excess of present government consumption plus investment in project K over first-period 
revenues, i.e., G1+I−R1, must be financed by issuing government debt, B1. The excess of debt 
service, government consumption and investment in project L over public revenue in the 
second period, rB1+G2+J−R2, is financed by additional government debt, B2−B1. In the final 
period the financial return on project L must cover principal and interest on accumulated debt. 
 
The first set of optimality conditions in the third panel of Table 1 states that the marginal 
utility of consumption in each period must equal the cost of public funds ηU. Demand for 
public consumption in each period thus declines with the cost of public funds. Furthermore, 
public consumption is smoothed over time, i.e., G1 = G2 = G(ηU), G′<0, where from now on 
subscript “U” denotes the apolitical outcome. Since it is optimal to smooth public 
consumption, the present-value budget constraint implies the following level of public debt: 
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the permanent levels of exogenous public revenues and losses on public investment project K 
and L, respectively. Hence, if there is a temporary fall in public revenues (R1<RP), 
government debt is used to contain the fall in government consumption today in such a way 
that it matches the fall in future government consumption (cf., Barro, 1979). Similarly, the 
incumbent government runs up a government debt for public investment in as far as the 
project earns its initial outlays back in the future (i.e., with φρKK = I, BB1 is raised with an 
amount I, ceteris paribus). 
 
The second optimality condition in the third panel of Table 1 implies that the future financial 
return on investment, i.e., ρL LJ(JU, IU), plus the ideological return on project L must equal the 
return on government debt, 1+r: 
 
(1A)      [ρL + (1−λ) ψ/ηU] LJ(JU, IU) = 1 + r   ⇒     
() ++




The ideological return on project L increases, of course, with the fraction of the population 
that is in favour of this type of investment 1−λ. It needs to be deflated by the marginal cost of 
public funds, ηU, to convert from utility to resource units. The demand for public investment 
in the second period JU thus declines with the cost of public funds and increases with the 
fraction 1-λ of people in the population that prefer project L rather than K. It also increases 
with the financial return (ρL). If the marginal return on future investment increases with 
current investment (i.e., LJI > 0), demand for investment in project L rises with past 
investment in project K.  
 
The third optimality condition, the first-order condition for investment in project K, states that 
the financial plus ideological return on project K plus the corresponding indirect returns on 
project L should equal the return on government debt: 
 
(2A)  [ρK+λψ/ηU]K′(IU) + φ[ρL+(1−λ)ψ/ηU]LI(JU,IU) = 1+r
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Hence, public investment in project K, i.e., IU, declines with the cost of public funds ηU and 
the cost of borrowing/the rate at which future utility flows are discounted r. Investment IU 
increases with its own financial return ρK and the ideological return ψ. If public investment in   6
project K affects project L positively (i.e., LI>0), IU also increases with the financial return ρL 
on project L. Further, if the future marginal return on project L is reinforced by investment in 
project K (i.e., LJI>0), IU rises with future investment JU in project L. The effect on IU of an 
increase in the fraction of people in the population that prefers project K rather than L (i.e., λ) 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher λ raises the fraction of the people that directly 
derives utility from project K. This has a positive effect on investment IU. On the other hand, 
a smaller share of the population derives utility from IU in an indirect way through its positive 
effect on L. This affects IU negatively. If the direct effect dominates, then we have dIU/dλ>0. 
If the ideological return ψ on public investment is zero, (2A) states that the direct and 
indirect financial return on project K equals the return on bonds, ρKK′(IU)+φρLLI(JU, IU)=1+r. 
However, if the ideological return on project K is positive, ψ>0, (2A) indicates that the total 
marginal financial return on project K falls short of the market rate of return, 1+r. 
   If L(J, I) is separable, investment in project K does not depend on future investment 
in project L. If L(J, I) is not separable, we solve (1A) and (2A) to give: 
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Substituting (3A) together with the demand for current and future public consumption into the 
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If the government has more public revenue R1 or R2 at its disposal, the cost of public funds is 
lower. The terms in the two sets of square brackets indicate the financial losses on project K 
and project L, respectively. If investments are at their break-even levels, these terms in square 
brackets are zero, public investment can be de-budgeted from the present-value government 
budget constraint, and the golden rule of public finance is satisfied. Then, if the government 
needs to issue additional debt to finance government consumption (R1<G1), a higher interest 
rate r pushes up the cost of public funds. Conversely, if R1>G1, higher r pushes down ηU. 
If the marginal financial return on public investment initially exactly matches the 
return on government debt, i.e., ρKK′(I)+ρLLI/(1+r)=1+r and ρLLJ(J, I)=1+r, a higher financial 
return on project K or L, i.e., higher ρK or ρL, always eases the government budget constraint 
and thus lowers the cost of public funds. If the marginal financial return on investment falls   7
short of the return on bonds, ρKK′(I)+ρLLI/(1+r)<1+r and ρLLJ(J, I)<1+r, the effects of higher 
financial returns on public investment on the cost of public funds are no longer unambiguous. 
On the one hand, an increase in ρK or ρL raises available resources for given investments in 
projects K, respectively L, thereby reducing the cost of funds. On the other hand, higher ρK or 
ρL boosts investment in these projects and thus pushes up the cost of funds. Also, if the 
marginal effect of I on L is large relative to that on K (more precisely, if LI>K′), a higher 
fraction λ of people that prefers project K lowers the cost of public funds. A higher value of λ 
reduces the attractiveness of the project with the higher marginal return in I relative to that 
with the lower marginal return. Hence, this causes a reduction in I. On top of this, investment 
J in project L becomes less desirable. Both effects imply a fall in the demand for funds. 
Hence, the cost of funds shrinks. If the marginal effect of I on L is relatively small, the effect 
of λ on the cost of funds remains ambiguous. 
If we substitute the cost of funds (4A) into (3A) and G(ηU), we find the optimal levels 
of government consumption and investment. Alternatively, we can solve the social welfare 
problem with dynamic programming. The social planner then proceeds by backward recursion. 
It is easy to show that this yields the same outcome, since optimality requires that the cost of 
public funds in all periods must be the same, i.e. η1U=η2U =ηU. 
 
Proposition 1: In the apolitical outcome public consumption and the cost of funds are 
smoothed. Government debt is used to finance public investment until the marginal financial 
and ideological return on the project plus the indirect return via the complementarity with 
future projects equals the cost of issuing extra debt. Public investment is high if public 
revenues are high and the cost of funds is low or if the utility to the people and the financial 
return are high. 
 
3. Political outcome in the absence of scrap 
3.1. A bipartisan framework with polarised preferences about public investment 
Instead of a median voter approach (e.g., Bassetto and Sargent, 2006), we use a two-party 
partisan approach (cf., Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). The preferences and budget constraints 
are presented in the top two panels of Table 2. There are two political parties denoted by P 
and Q, respectively. They differ in their preference for the type of public investment projects 
(e.g., railroads versus roads). Only party P obtains an ideological return from investing in 
project K, whereas party Q obtains an ideological return from investing in project L (if ψ>0). 
Both parties obtain the same financial returns from both projects. Subscript P indicates that 
the incumbent P secures re-election; subscript Q indicates that party Q gains office.   8
Without loss of generality, assume that party P is in power in the first period and 
chooses public consumption G1 and public investment in the infrastructure of its choice I. It 
leaves a public debt to the next government B1 equal to the excess of spending G1+I over 
exogenous revenue R1. At the end of the first period, there are elections. Whoever gets into 
office in the second period, must repay the debt incurred during the first period plus interest. 
The incumbent P is re-elected with probability π and with probability (1−π) party Q gets into 
office. Since elections depend on other variables than the type of public investment, the 
probability of re-election, π, can differ from unity (zero) even if the fraction λ of people in 
favour of project K is larger (smaller) than 50%. 
The party that secures office in the second period pays off debt including interest, 
(1+r)B1, cashes the financial return on public investment ρKK(I) and uses the remaining funds 
for public consumption G2 and investment J in project L. Investment in project L induces 
more capital, especially if investment has already taken place in the period before. For 
example, government P may be strong in province K and wish to build a railroad from the 
capital city to province K. Party Q, however, may have a strong base in province L and want 
to relay the original rail-track from province K to province L. It then makes sense to have 
LJI>0. Each governing party cashes the financial returns from the operation of the railway. 
In the closing period the financial return on project L pays for principal and interest 
on the debt left at the end of the second period. The present-value budget constraint states that 
the present value of current and future government spending cannot exceed that of current and 
future government revenue. We abstract from distorting taxes, so that financial investment is 
only possible by cutting government consumption today or, via an increase in government 
debt, in the future. 
Each political party obtains utility from government consumption, u(G1)+φu(G2), and 
from their own ideological capital stock, ψφK(I) or ψφ
2L(J,I). Ideological projects with no 
financial returns correspond to ψ=1 and ρK=ρL=0. Market projects with only a financial return 
correspond to ψ=0 and ρK>0 and ρL>0. In general, investment projects have both an 
ideological and a financial return. Note that, even if the incumbent is kicked out of office, it 
still receives the ideological return ψφK(I) in period 2 as the project is in existence then. 
 
3.2. Strategic investment in face of political uncertainty 
The timing of events is crucial for the political outcome. To ensure time consistency, we work 
backwards and start with the policies that have to be chosen after the election. The third panel 
of Table 2 presents the post-election outcomes. The party that gains office in the second 
period cashes the exogenous revenues plus financial returns on party P’s earlier investment,   9
pays off principal and interest on public debt and spends the remaining funds on public 
consumption and investment in project L. If party i secures office, it chooses consumption G2i 
and investment Ji to maximise second-period utility Vi subject to the budget constraints of the 
second and final period, where i=P,Q. This yields the following insights. 
First, the marginal utility of public consumption must equal government i’s marginal 
cost of public funds ηi, i=P,Q. This yields the demand for public consumption as a negative 
function of the cost of public funds, G2i = G(ηi), G′<0, i=P,Q. 
Second, if party P gets into office in the second period, it sets investment in project L 
such that its marginal financial return equals the cost of capital (the purchase price plus the 
interest rate), i.e., ρLLJ(JP,  I) = 1+r. Party Q ensures that the total marginal return on 
investment, i.e., the marginal financial return plus the ideological return divided by the cost of 
funds, must equal the user cost of capital under Q’s reign: 
 
(1P)            (ρL+ψ/ηQ) LJ(JQ, I) = 1+r. 
 
The main difference with condition (1A) for the apolitical outcome is that party Q gives full 
ideological weight to investment in project L, so ignores the wishes of the people that do not 
care about investment in project L. These first-order conditions yield the second-period 
investment in project L under party P, respectively Q: 
 
(5)          and  . 
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Combining these with the second-period budget constraints of the respective parties, we 
obtain the cost of funds under the second-period rule of party P and Q, respectively: 
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Higher exogenous resources R2 and a higher return ρK on investment in K reduce the cost of 
funds, but a larger stock of debt, BB1, raises the cost of funds. Under Q’s reign the effect of a 
higher interest rate r on the cost of funds is ambiguous. It depresses demand for investment in 
project L and the need for funds and thus lowers the cost of funds. But it also depresses the 
present value of the financial return on project L and thus pushes up the cost of funds. Also, 
the effect of a higher financial return on project L on the cost of funds is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, a higher financial return raises available resources and lowers the cost of funds. On   10
the other hand, it raises the demand for investment in project L, thus pushing up the cost of 
funds. Similarly, larger investment in K has an ambiguous effect on the cost of funds. With 
party Q in power, the need for funds and the cost of funds are high if the ideological value of 
investment projects (i.e., ψ) is high and thus the demand for public investment is high. 
The fourth panel of Table 2 presents the pre-election outcomes. The incumbent 
government maximises its expected utility fully aware of the after-election consequences of 
party Q possibly taking over power on the level of government consumption and the capital it 
has invested in project K. The optimal level of public consumption follows from setting the 
marginal utility of government consumption u′(G1) equal to the pre-election marginal cost of 
public funds, η1. Investment by the incumbent government follows from: 
 
(2P)  (πηPρK+ψ) K′(I) + φπηP ρL
P
I L  + (1−π)ηQ [ρKK′(I) + (φρL
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η . / , Q  JJη ≡∂ ∂ etcetera. The total marginal return of investment to 
the incumbent government must equal the user cost of capital in the first period times the 
gross interest rate, i.e., (1+r)η1. The total marginal return of investment equals the marginal 
financial return of investing in public capital plus the marginal ideological return. The latter 
component is given by ψ K ′. The direct marginal financial returns are πηPρKK′ and 
(1−π)ηQρKK′ weighted with the respective re-election probabilities and the respective costs of 
public funds. The present values of the indirect marginal financial returns are φπηPρL
P
I L  and 
(1−π)ηQφρL
Q
I L  due to the positive effect of first period investment on the financial return on 
project L (under both government types, weighted with the likelihood of their appearance and 
the relevant cost of public funds). These indirect returns obviously depend on second-period 
investment. There are two additional indirect components of the marginal financial return. 




I J  captures the positive effect of first-period investment on 
second-period investment and, thereby, on the financial return on L. The second one is 
negative and concerns the drain on resources   caused by the higher outlay on J. The future 
marginal financial returns under government Q are diluted by Q’s excessive investment (from 
P’s perspective) in J when it values project L for ideological reasons. 
Q
I J  11
Party Q thus attaches ideological utility to the project L that is not valued by the 
incumbent government P and that drives a wedge between the valuation of parties P and Q of 
this project (i.e., pushes ξ down). This crucial effect thus manifests itself by a value of the key 
coefficient ξ that is less than one if ψ>0. Consequently, holding all costs of funds constant 
and assuming that an increase in I has a positive net marginal financial benefit under Q’s 
reign,
2 the incumbent party P invests less in project K to discourage a possible future 
government under the rule of party Q to invest in project L.
 
Finally, the dynamic efficiency condition for the optimal level of public debt is: 
 
(7)       π ηP + (1–π) ηQ ξ = η1. 
 
The marginal benefit of extra public debt at the end of the first term must equal the expected 
marginal cost in the second term (the left-hand side of the equation). The weight given to the 
future cost of public funds under a possible future rule of party Q is driven below one, 
because of Q’s incentive to invest in a project to which party P does not attach any ideological 
value. This political distortion implies ξ<1 and that the incumbent government P cares less 
about containing debt. Effectively, the current cost of funds is reduced below the expected 
future cost of funds and this encourages the incumbent government to spend and borrow more. 
 
3.3. Comparison of apolitical and partisan outcomes 
In the sequel we use the terms ‘debt bias’ and ‘investment bias’ when (for given parameters) 
public debt and investment, respectively, under the partisan government exceed their levels 
chosen by the social planner under the apolitical outcome. 
 
3.3.1. Special case: party P faces no electoral uncertainty (π=1) 
It is instructive to study first the case where party P faces no electoral uncertainty (π=1). If in 
the Alesina and Tabellini (1990) framework electoral uncertainty vanishes, the debt bias also 
vanishes. Knowing that future resources can no longer be ‘lost’ to a type of public good that 
the current government does not value, the governing party no longer has an incentive to 
overspend at the cost of future spending. In our set-up, matters are more complicated. With 
π=1, the conditions (2P) and (7) that determine investment I and public debt BB
                                                
1 simplify to: 
 
(8)         (ρK+ψ/ηP) K′(I) + φ ρL
P
I L  = 1+r  and  ηP = η1. 
 
2 That is, the term in square brackets in (2P) should be positive. 
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The second condition implies that public consumption must be the same in both periods, just 
like under a social planner. Equation (2P) needs to be compared with (2A). Holding the cost 
of funds equal in the two cases (ηP=ηU), then if λ=1, the investment outcomes under the 
partisan and the planner case are equal. However, in general, debt and also first-period 
investment differ from the apolitical outcome. With 0<λ<1, the comparison between party P’s 
investment in K and the planner’s investment in K becomes ambiguous. The partisan 
government attaches a higher ideological weight to project K than the planner, inducing it to 
invest more (higher I). However, the zero ideological weight that the partisan incumbent 
attaches to future investment L induces it to invest less (lower I). 
 
3.3.2. Absence of complementarity between investment in project K and L 
In this case equation (2P) simplifies to (πηPρK+ψ) K′(I) +(1−π)ηQρKK′(I) = (1+r)η1. Using 
(7), this reduces further to (ρK+ψ/η1) K′(I)= (1+r). Clearly, holding the cost of funds constant 
(η1=ηU), investment I is larger under a partisan government than under the planner (compare 
with (2A) with LI=0). We also see that party Q’s ideological attachment to project L only 
affects investment I indirectly via the cost of funds η1. 
 
3.3.3. Numerical comparison between planner and partisan government 
To better understand the political economy of public investment, we present some numerical 
results in Table 3. We adopt an iso-elastic utility function for government consumption. 
Parameter ε is the coefficient of relative risk aversion while δ regulates the welfare share of 
public consumption relative to investment. The demand functions for public consumption 
have an elasticity with respect to the cost of funds equal to −1/ε = −0.67. We want that before- 
and post-election investment projects reinforce each other, but are not perfect substitutes in 
order to avoid a degenerate solution. The specified Cobb-Douglas production function creates 
future capital out of past and present investment. We set the interest rate and the rate of time 
preference at 0.2. Preferences are completely polarised (λ=π=0.5). Table 3 presents the results, 
assuming decreasing returns to scale of project L in past and future investment (i.e., σ+θ<1).
3 
In the apolitical case, there is no uncertainty and social welfare is given in Table 1. In the 
political case, utilitarian social welfare aggregates all individual utilities and is calculated as: 
 
                                                 
3 We avoid a constant returns specification (as is often used), because if we introduce scrap in Section 5 
and σ+θ=1, the cost of funds ηQ will be fixed by party Q’s first-order conditions and thus becomes 
independent of party P’s actions in the first period. In fact, numerical comparison of outcomes under 
constant and decreasing returns to scale did not reveal any qualitative differences.   13
u(G1) + φπ u(G2P) + φ(1−π) u(G2Q) + λ φψK(I) + (1−λ)φ
2ψ[πL(JP,I)+(1−π)L(JQ,I)]. 
 
The first three terms capture current and expected future discounted utility from public 
consumption and are the same for all individuals. The fourth term stands for the ideological 
benefit from project K and is only valued by a fraction λ of the population. The final term 
captures the ideological benefit from project L and is only valued by the other part of the 
population. This final term consists of two components, which capture the probability-
weighted outcomes of L under the two possible types of government in the second period. 
We first compare the apolitical (planner’s) and partisan outcomes presented in Table 
3. In all cases debt is higher under the partisan government. Also first-period investment is 
always higher than under the planner as the partisan government gives full weight to 
investment I while the planner only attaches a weight corresponding to the population share in 
favour of project K. 
We now discuss the effects of perturbations in the various parameters of the model: 
•  A higher utility weight for public spending δ raises public spending and reduces investment. 
Because public spending is not subject to a partisan bias, the debt level falls with a higher δ. 
•  A higher elasticity of demand for public consumption with respect to the cost of funds 
(higher 1/ε) marginally raises demand for public consumption by the incumbent P in period 1. 
Also, it is more attractive for P to invest in project K. These two effects result in higher public 
debt. Under both parties second-period consumption is lower than under the baseline, while 
investment in project L is higher, reflecting the positive effect that the higher level of first-
period investment has on the marginal contribution of investment J to project L. 
•  A lower interest rate r boosts investment by the incumbent P. The reason is that the market 
interest rate also corresponds to the subjective discount rate of party P. Since the returns on 
P’s investment in project K only materialise in the second period and a lower discount rate 
raises the relative weight of future utility terms, P will make a bigger investment in K. 
•  A lower interest rate r also makes debt issuance less expensive and thus leads to an 
increase in public debt. It also leads to a drop in public consumption (under the social planner 
and in the partisan case of party P in both periods and party Q in period 2). This may seem 
surprising, but the reason is that the drop in public consumption is necessary to make possible 
the increase in investment engendered by the lower interest rate. The drop in public 
consumption in the second period under P is the result of higher debt servicing costs that are 
only partly offset by more financial return on project K. In case of party Q taking over in the 
second period, the drop in consumption is reinforced by the higher investment in project L.   14
•  An increase in the financial return ρK on project K boosts both investment in project K and 
project L, because of the complementarity of the projects and the more generous availability 
of resources in the second period. Similarly, an increase in ρL boosts investment in both 
project L and in K, because of the higher indirect return via the complementarity with project 
L. Obviously, consumption smoothing and the need to finance those additional investments 
producing higher future returns, require higher public debt. The effects on government 
consumption are ambiguous for the various cases, since a larger amount of available resources 
allows for more government consumption (an “income effect”) while the higher return on the 
investment project (which contributes to utility) leads to a shift from government 
consumption to investment (a “substitution effect”). 
•  Higher government revenue R1 or R2 raises party P’s public consumption in both periods as 
well as investments in projects K and L. Higher revenue during P’s first reign of office R1 
corresponds to a temporary increase in public revenue, so it is optimal to save for the next 
period of government by reducing debt. However, the reduction in the public debt is rather 
small compared to the rise in investment I. While consumption under party P is higher in the 
second period, consumption under party Q is actually (slightly) lower than under the baseline, 
the reason being that the due to the reinforcing character of investments I and J, investment J 
is so much higher that this dominates the effect of the higher financial return on K and the 
lower debt servicing costs in period 2. Similar results obtain when R2 is raised, although in 
that case public debt goes up substantially in order to smooth public consumption. 
•  Less ideological return on government investment projects (i.e., ψ=0.1) leads to less 
investments in both projects while government consumption is boosted. As a result, there is 
less accumulation of government debt. Interestingly, the polarisation becomes less severe and 
thus the level of government consumption is less affected by whether party P or party Q gains 
office. The welfare loss arising from the partisan bias is much less than before. 
 
We summarise the results of this section in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Ideological attachment by a rival successor to investment projects that are not 
valued by the incumbent drives the cost of funds to the incumbent below the expected future 
cost of funds. This induces the incumbent to issue more debt and to invest more in its pet 
investment project. Furthermore, the lower cost of funds for the incumbent boosts demand for 
government consumption so that there is no smoothing of public consumption. These political 
distortions are particularly large if the probability of being removed from office is high. The 
partisan government invests more in its pet project than the planner, since the planner also 
cares about the other investment project.   15
 
4. Analysis with scrap 
We now allow the government to scrap part of investment in project K in the second period. 
We denote the amount of scrap by S. Scrapping yields βS at the second-hand market, which 
can be used for public consumption or investment in Q’s own favourite project. The capital 
production function for project L is now written L(J,I−S). For example, think of a road that at 
extra cost can be converted into a railway. Part of the original road may be dismantled and 
sold for its land value, implying a shorter railway track and thus a smaller L. We first analyse 
the outcomes under the planner and then turn to the case of the partisan government. 
 
4.1. Social planner with scrap 
Again, the planner smoothes consumption over time, G1 = G2 = G(ηU), G′<0, and thus: 
 
() ( ) ( ) 1 1 /2 . P B R R I LOSSK LOSSL S r β = −+ − − + + 
 
The final term is new and shows that the government borrows more if it anticipates more 
scrap revenue. This way the revenues from scrap are smoothed over time. The first-order 
condition for investment in project L is still given by (1A), with the term IU-SU replacing IU. 
In addition, the planner sets the marginal financial plus ideological losses of scrapping to the 
scrap price times the rate of interest: 
 
(9A)     [ρL + (1–λ) ψ/ηQ] LI(JU, IU -SU) = (1+r) β. 
 
The planner weighs the marginal ideological loss by the share 1–λ of the population that 
attaches value to project L. Combining (1A) and (9A), we see that the marginal rate of 
substitution between past and future investment must equal the scrap price of past investment, 
LI/LJ=β. Conditions (1A) and (9A) can be solved together for scrapping and investment: 
 
(10A)      and  . 
() ++
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Higher past investment I leads one-for-one to scrapping in the second period. A higher cost of 
public funds, a higher interest rate and a lower financial or ideological return on project L 
reduces the demand for investment by government Q and induces more scrapping. A higher 
scrap price β implies that it is more attractive to scrap past investments of government P. As a   16
result, if investments in the two projects reinforce each other (i.e., LIJ > 0), the productivity of 
investment J falls and thus there is a decline in investment in project L. 
The first-order condition for investment in the first period is still given by (2A), with 
the term L(JU,IU-SU) replacing L(JU,IU), so that the sum of the present discounted marginal 
financial plus ideological returns (directly via K and indirectly through the effect of I on J and, 
hence, on L) should equal the cost of funds. If we use (9A), condition (2A) becomes: 
 
(2A′)     [ρK+λψ/ηU]K′(IU) + β = 1+r. 
 
Hence, the marginal return in the second period of an additional unit of investment in project 
K consists of the marginal financial and ideological return plus the marginal revenue of 
scrapping one unit (recall that one additional unit of I leads to one more unit of scrap). 
 
4.2. Partisan outcome with scrap 
The parties trade off scrap value against the marginal return on investment in project L. For 
party P, the marginal return on investment in project L only involves a financial return, but for 
party Q it is both a financial and an ideological return. In the second period both parties 
choose government consumption, investment in project L and now also the amount of scrap. 
The first-order conditions for public spending are again u′(G2i) = ηi, i = P,Q. The optimality 
conditions for investment in L by parties P and Q are changed to, respectively: 
 
(1P′)          ρL LJ(JP, I–SP) = 1 + r    and    (ρL + ψ/ηQ) LJ(JQ, I–SQ) = 1 + r.  
 
The first-order conditions for scrapping are, respectively, for P and Q: 
 
(9P)   ρL LI(JP, I– SP) = (1+r) β   and   (ρL + ψ/ηQ) LI(JQ, I–SQ) = (1+r) β. 
 
Given that the ideological returns on project L are zero for party P, this party sets the marginal 
revenue β of one more unit of scrap equal to the discounted marginal financial cost associated 
with the fall in public capital L. Party Q gives full weight to the ideological return while the 
planner attaches only a weight 1–λ to the ideological return – compare (9P) with (9A). 
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As under the planner, scrap increases one for one with the investment made in the first period. 
Also the signs of the partial derivatives of scrap with respect to the interest rate, the second-
hand price of scrap and the marginal financial return on L are the same as under the planner. 
Since P only scraps for financial reasons, only scrap under party Q depends on the cost of 
funds and the ideological value it attaches to capital L, where the signs of the partial 
derivatives are as under the social planner. 
Substituting demand for government investment and scrapping (10P) as well as 
demand for government consumption into the post-election budget constraints of the two 
parties and solving for the cost of funds yields: 
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The cost of public funds is high if the debt plus interest inherited from party P is high, 
exogenous revenues are low, first-period investment (and, thus, its financial revenues) are low 
and the scrap value of party P’s investment project is low. Not surprisingly, the cost of funds 
is also high if the financial return on project K is low as available resources are comparatively 
low. However, with party Q in power, the need for revenue and the cost of funds are high if 
the ideological value it attaches to project L (i.e., ψ) is high and thus the demand for public 
investment is high. Also, under Q, the effect of a higher interest rate r on the cost of funds is 
ambiguous. The interest rate affects the cost of funds in three ways. It reduces the present 
value of the financial return on a project L of given size. This pushes up the cost of funds. It 
also depresses demand for investment in project L. The resulting cash saving exceeds the 
resulting fall in the financial return on L, because, when evaluated at its equilibrium outcome, 
the marginal return on J is dominated by the market interest rate. The third effect is that an 
increase in the interest rate raises scrap. The marginal cash revenue on the second-hand 
market for scrap exceeds the induced reduction in the financial revenue on L. The second and 
third effects contribute to a negative effect of the interest rate on the cost of funds. These two 
effects disappear if P is in power, so that under P an increase in r has an unambiguous 
positive effect on the cost of funds. Finally, under Q the consequences of a higher marginal 
return on L are ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher value of ρL raises the financial return 
for given values of scrap and investment J. On the other hand, the increase in ρL induces more 
investment J, which at the margin fails to earn back its cash outlay, and less scrap, for which   18
the foregone cash revenue dominates the financial return on the increased capital stock L. 
With P in power these last two effects vanish and the effect of a change in ρL on the cost of 
funds is unambiguous. 
  The fourth panel of Table 2 presents the pre-election outcome in this bipartisan 
framework. The incumbent government maximises its expected utility being fully aware of 
the after-election consequences of party Q taking over power on the level of government 
consumption and the capital it has invested in project K. The optimal level of public 
consumption follows from setting the marginal utility of government consumption u′(G1) to 
the pre-election cost of public funds, η1. Investment by the incumbent follows from: 
 
(11)     (ρK+ψ/η1) K′(I) + β = 1+r. 
 
The marginal ideological plus financial return (payback plus scrap) on investment should 
equal the user cost of capital. Finally, the dynamic efficiency condition for public debt is: 
 
(7′)  π ηP + (1−π) ηQ ξ
S = η1   where    ( )
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Again, the marginal benefit of public debt equals the expected future marginal cost. The 
weight given to the future cost of public funds under a possible future rule of party Q is now 
driven more severely below one due to the extra term in the denominator than when there is 
no scrapping, again provided that Q has an incentive to invest in a project to which party P 
does not attach any ideological value (cf., the definition of ξ after equation (2P)). If the 
ideological return on project L is positive, the optimal scrapping condition (9P) implies that 
the scrap value exceeds the discounted value of future financial returns. With scrapping, the 
current cost of funds is therefore driven even more below the expected future cost of funds 
and this encourages the incumbent government to invest and borrow even more. 
 
4.3. Comparison of planner with partisan government when there is scrapping 
4.3.1. Special case: party P faces no electoral uncertainty (π=1) 
If there is no electoral uncertainty, the dynamic efficiency condition for public debt under 
party P becomes ηP = η1. We thus have equal government consumption in the two periods. 
Holding first-period government consumption constant across the planner’s and partisan cases 
(thus, ηU=η1), the partisan case will be characterised by over-investment and a debt bias. 
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4.3.2. Numerical comparison between planner and partisan government 
For our numerical comparison between the planner and the partisan government with 
scrapping, we use the same specifications and parameter choices as before. The computation 
of social welfare now takes account of the effect of scrapping on project L. A couple of the 
results reported in panel (b) of Table 3 stand out.
4 First, as long as there are full ideological 
returns, the planner finds it optimal not to scrap any of the investment done in the first 
period,
5 thereby making optimal use of the complementary nature of earlier investment with 
the new investment in project L. Only if the ideological return becomes small (ψ=0.1), 
scrapping gets positive as the benefit from investment in project L gets small. The extra return 
from scrapping induces party P to substantially increase investment (compared to the case 
without scrapping). Indeed, if party P remains in office in the second period, it scraps virtually 
all earlier investment as the benefit from leaving some of the investment in place only results 
in some additional financial return on project L. Investment in project K is thus always higher 
under party P than under the planner. Moreover, as suggested by Proposition 1, government 
debt is also always larger than under the planner. Furthermore, in line with Proposition 2, 
investment in project K and government debt is for each case higher when the government is 
allowed to scrap than when scrapping is not permitted (compare with panel (a) in Table 3). 
This is not necessarily true for government consumption. A lower scrap value (β=0.35) leads, 
not surprisingly, to less scrapping and less scrap revenues. As a result, a potential rival 
government needs to be constrained less, and thus the incumbent invests less and runs up less 
government debt. The smaller political distortions allow a higher level of current government 
consumption for the incumbent and also a higher level if re-elected. If the rival gets re-elected, 
it spends less on government consumption but invests more in its pet project, since it scraps 
less of the complementary investment done in the first period. The following proposition 
summarises the main results of this section: 
 
Proposition 3: With scrapping, there is an extra reason for the current cost of public funds to 
fall short of the expected future cost of funds in the partisan outcome. As a result, there is an 
extra strategic reason for the incumbent government to invest and borrow. 
 
Scrapping may even reduce social welfare even though scrapping yields financial revenues – 
compare last columns of panels (a) and (b) of Table 3. If the incumbent P is re-elected, it 
scraps almost all of its original investment in project K, thereby lowering the ideological 
                                                 
4 We left out many of the perturbations in Table 3(b), since they are qualitatively similar to the ones in 
Table 3(a).   20
return on investment in project L that part of the population receives. From the perspective of 
this part of the population, most of the massive earlier investment in K is simply wasted. This 
indicates that scrapping gives a reason for substantial strategic over-investment in the pet 
project of the incumbent to tie the hands of a potential rival, only to be scrapped again once 
re-election is ensured. In other words, in a partisan context, giving a political party more 
margins for freedom may actually be harmful, as it may exacerbate a pre-existing strategic 
inefficiency. Further numerical analysis (not reported in Table 3) shows that if the share λ of 
the population that prefers project K is sufficiently large, social welfare under scrapping 
exceeds that when scrapping is not allowed. 
 
 
5. Fiscal restrictions 
The partisan allocation rarely coincides with that under the social planner. In this section, we 
examine whether appropriate fiscal rules and constraints are able to bring the partisan solution 
closer to the social optimum. In particular, we explore the benefits of restrictions on public 
investment and a deficit rule. Throughout this section, we allow for scrapping (part of) the 
investment in project K during the second period. 
 
5.1. Restrictions on public investment 
Let us turn to the partisan outcomes if investments by both parties are restricted to some 
values I = I
R > 0 and J = J
R > 0. The demand function for public consumption if i (=P, Q) gets 
into office is given by G2i=G(ηi), G′<0. Without scrapping, the costs of funds are given by: 
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The main difference with (6) is that the restricted future investment level J
R now appears as an 
exogenous parameter determining the second-period cost of funds. Its effect is ambiguous. 
When φρLLJ<1, an increase in J
R enhances second period resources and lowers the costs of 
funds. The opposite occurs when φρLLJ>1, while for φρLLJ=1, the effect of J
R on the costs of 
funds is nil. The dynamic efficiency condition for public debt becomes: 
 
    π ηP + (1–π) ηQ = η1. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Solving the model yields a negative solution for the optimal level of scrapping. As we rule out   21
Substituting the investment restrictions into the second-period budget constraints under the 
two types of governments, we find G2P = G2Q. Combined with the optimality condition for the 
public debt, we conclude that η1 = ηP =ηQ, which implies perfect consumption smoothing 
over time, irrespective of who is in office in the second period. Setting the investment 
restrictions at the planner’s investment levels, the planner’s allocation is fully replicated and 
social welfare is maximised, as can also be seen from panel (a) of Table 4. 
  When scrapping is allowed, the optimal scrapping conditions are as before, except 
that investments in those conditions are restricted to the indicated levels. Hence, we have: 
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Also, the costs of funds if P, respectively Q, gains office in the second period are: 
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The dynamic efficiency condition for the optimal level of public debt (7′) and the demand 
function for consumption by government P are unaffected, but the wedge between the 
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Again, if public investment is ideologically motivated and scrapping is allowed, there is a 
wedge between the valuations of parties P and Q of project L (i.e., 0<ξ
RS<1). More 
importantly, ceteris paribus, the wedge with investment restrictions is smaller than without 
such restrictions (i.e., ξ
RS>ξ
S>0). Effectively, the investment restriction brings the current cost 
of funds more in line with the expected future cost of funds and thus weakens the strategic 
incentive to borrow.  
 
Panel (b) in Table 4 reports the outcomes with restrictions on public investment when 
scrapping is permitted. Investments are restricted to the levels chosen by the planner. Debt 
levels are still higher and welfare levels are lower than under the planner. The higher debt 
levels reflect the (higher) expected future revenue from scrapping, because party P benefits 
                                                                                                                                            
negative scrapping as economically meaningless, we resolve the model restricting scrapping to zero.   22
less from the complementarity between projects K and L than the planner and thus has an 
incentive to scrap more of its original investment. However, compared with the partisan 
solution in the absence of restrictions (see panel (b) of Table 3), debt is lower and welfare is 
higher under these investment restrictions. With future investment restricted to a certain level, 
any future resources freed up by a debt reduction now will be channelled towards higher 
future public consumption. For any given level of future investment this induces the 
incumbent to issue less debt. This is the key channel by which investment restrictions remove 
a political distortion and increase welfare. 
Social welfare is maximised by relaxing the restriction on I somewhat and tightening 
the restriction on J – see the final line of panel (b) in Table 4. This result is not robust, 
however. For sufficiently low values of β we find that it is optimal to tighten the restrictions 
on both investment projects relative to the planner’s investment levels. The restriction on 
investment in project L is always tighter than under the planner, because if party P comes to 
power the return on the investment in L is relatively small as P scraps most of the original 
investment in project K. Given that the restriction does not discriminate between who is in 
power after the election, in selecting its optimal level this scenario has be taken into account. 
The tightening of the restriction on investment in project L (relative to the planner’s 
investment) frees up resources that can be used for more investment in project K or for public 
consumption. Relaxing the restriction on I is relatively rewarding if the financial revenue β 
from scrapping is sufficiently high, because more investment I leads to more scrapping. If the 
financial revenue from scrapping is low, the incentive of party P to scrap when the planner 
would optimally not scrap dominates in setting the optimal restriction on I. A tighter 
restriction brings P’s choice of scrapping closer to the planner’s choice of zero scrap. If 
financial returns on public investment become relatively more important than ideological 
returns, the investment restrictions need to be less tight. In the absence of ideological returns, 
no investment restrictions are needed at all. We summarise our results for investment 
restrictions in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: In a partisan framework, when scrapping is not allowed, the optimal 
investment restrictions coincide with the planner’s investment choices and yield the social 
optimum. With scrapping, this is no longer the case. The restrictions bring the current cost of 
funds more in line with the expected future cost of funds and thus diminish the strategic 
incentive to borrow too much. Investment restrictions therefore raise social welfare. Such 
restrictions are not needed if projects only have financial returns, since then the partisan and 
planner outcomes coincide. 
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5.2. A debt restriction 
Now we consider a debt (or deficit) restriction. A special case arises if the debt/deficit level is 
restricted to zero. A more general rule requires that debt should not exceed a certain fraction 
of government revenues R1. We simply assume that debt is restricted to some level  . 
Because the results are qualitatively the same under no scrap and scrap, we focus mostly on 
the latter case. Conditional on  , the after-election outcomes are the same as without the 






(12)   π (ηP/η1)[ρKK′(I) +β] + (ψ/η1) K′(I) + (1−π)(ηQ/η1)[ρKK′(I) +β] ξ
BS = 1+r, 
 
where ξ
BS is given by the same expression as ξ
S, but evaluated at the equilibrium obtained at 
the restricted debt level. At the optimum, the expected discounted marginal return of 
investment in the second period should equal the cost of investment. The former consists of a 
probability-weighted average of the marginal returns under each of the two possible future 
governments. In turn, the future marginal return on I under party P is the sum of the marginal 
financial return on K, the marginal increase in scrap (both suitably modified by the relative 
costs of funds) and the marginal ideological return (transformed in terms of the single good 
by dividing by the cost of funds). The latter component is also present under party Q in the 
second period. The future marginal return on I under party Q further consists of the sum of the 
marginal financial return on K and the additional scrap (both suitably modified by the relative 
costs of funds), taking account of the fact that the additional financial return is diluted by 
ideologically motivated overspending on J, resulting in ξ
BS<1. 
Panels (c), for no scrap, and (d), for scrap, of Table 4 report the outcomes when 
public debt is restricted to the level chosen by the social planner. Because party Q in period 2 
would optimally choose negative scrap, in the latter case we resolve the model under the 
additional restriction SQ=0. In all cases, social welfare is higher than without this debt 
restriction (compare with Table 3, panel (b)), but lower than under the planner. The debt 
restriction alters the intra-temporal trade-off to party P. With full ideological returns (ψ=1), 
first-period government consumption is too high and investment in project K too low, 
reflecting that party Q may profit from investment I by boosting the investment in project L. 
Indeed investment in project L under party Q exceeds the planner’s investment in L, which 
reflects the larger ideological weight Q places on his pet project. 
Even under the optimal debt restriction (see the final line in Table 4), social welfare 
is lower than under the planner. The optimal debt restriction exceeds the planner’s debt level, 
since it makes a trade-off between over-investment in K and over-investment in L. Setting the   24
restriction above the planner’s debt level, induces party P to invest more in K. The additional 
debt-servicing costs in the second period then restrain investment in L when party Q comes to 
power and push its investment closer to the planner’s level. 
Social welfare under the optimal debt restriction is also lower than social welfare 
under the optimal investment restriction (compare with the final line in panel (a) of Table 4). 
This reflects the fact that the investment restriction is more directly targeted at the origin of 
the distortions, namely the differences in the ideological valuation of the two investment 
projects by the two parties. We summarise our results for debt restrictions as: 
 
Proposition 5: The optimal restriction on public debt exceeds the planner’s optimal debt 
level, because it needs to make a trade-off between over-investment in the two different public 
investment projects. Although restrictions on public debt are welfare improving, they are 
dominated by the optimal investment restrictions, which are targeted directly at the origins of 
the distortions. Again, restrictions on public debt are not necessary if investment projects only 
have financial returns. 
 
 
6. Political problems with the Golden Rule for debt-finance of public investment 
The golden rule is often advocated as a guide to running public deficits. It states that the 
government should finance consumption out of current revenues and only be allowed to 
borrow for public investment projects. The future returns will then pay for interest and 
principal.
6 Most US states follow this rule today and many other governments followed this 
rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although the golden rule is simple, it gives 
strong incentives for majorities in democracies to choose an efficient mix of public goods in 
democratic economies with growing populations of overlapping generations of finitely-lived 
agents (Bassetto and Sargent, 2006). In the limiting case with Ricardian debt neutrality, the 
golden rule does not enhance efficiency. US evidence suggests that the golden rule affects 
government policies (Bohn and Inman, 1996; Poterba, 1995; Poterba and Rueben, 2001). 
Our political economy approach departs from the median voter setting of Basseto and 
Sargent (2006) and focuses on the implications of parties having partisan preferences about 
the type of public investment rather than about the type of public consumption or size of the 
                                                 
6 Under those circumstances, capital spending can be de-budgeted. Such a rule would not generally be 
optimal. First, for purely financial reasons, it would be optimal to invest up to the point where the 
marginal financial return is equal to the market interest rate. Second, the golden rule does not take into 
account the ideological return on public investment. This would push the optimal level of public 
investment beyond that which maximises financial revenues and possibly even beyond the break-even 
level of public investment (if the ideological attachment to public investment is sufficiently large).   25
public sector. We show that there is a bias for too much public investment and government 
borrowing. We also show that a deficit rule can raise social welfare. Still, the deficit and debt 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact need not improve welfare. They are ad hoc and are the 
same for all economies of the EMU irrespective of their size or starting conditions (see the 
critique of Buiter (1985, 2003) and fail to recognise that reform of budgetary institutions is 
required (e.g., Wyplosz, 2002; Fabrizio and Mody, 2006). 
Restrictions on public investment and deficit rules can correct for a bias towards 
over-investment and excessive government debt. However, it is crucial how tight the 
restrictions are set. If limits on deficits are too tight, one may end up with too little public 
investment, especially if countries attempt to meet the targets by cutting government 
investment and forsaking future returns. Indeed, the Stability and Growth Pact may have the 
undesirable effect of reducing public investment relatively more than unproductive 
government spending (e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004; Beetsma and Debrun, 2004, 2007), 
but the empirical evidence that the Pact has crowded out public investment is not very 
convincing (Galí and Perotti, 2003; Turrini, 2004). With the Stability and Growth Pact 
countries are also tempted to shift expenditure below the line and use creative accounting, 
fiscal gimmickry, privatisation and other one-off operations to meet the fiscal targets 
especially if the deficit is in danger of rising above its target (e.g., Dafflon and Rossi, 1999; 
Easterly, 1999; Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; Miles-Ferretti and Moriyama, 2004; Alt and Lassen, 
2005; von Hagen and Wolf, 2005; Koen and van den Noord, 2006; Buti, Martins and Turrini, 
2006). Of course, there may be good efficiency grounds for privatisation but meeting tough 
deficit targets is a bad rationale for privatisation. If the targets are too loose and make an 
exception for public investment, countries will try to push all kinds of so-called investment 
projects with dubious financial returns under this heading. In that case, an independent fiscal 
council or a committee of wise persons may be called to take on the task of a more 
comprehensive fiscal surveillance comprising both government assets and liabilities and to 
reduce the incentives to manipulate the data to meet the targets. It also helps if the minister of 
finance is given the power to set the agenda (e.g., Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999). 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have arrived at four main conclusions. First, in a bipartisan political economy framework 
the incumbent government has an incentive to borrow excessively and overspend on large 
public investment projects in order to bind the hands of its successor, especially if the 
probability of being removed from office is large and the scrap value of public investment is 
considerable. The point is that ideological attachment by a rival successor to investment 
projects that are not valued by the incumbent drives the cost of funds to the incumbent below   26
the expected future cost of funds. This induces the incumbent to invest more in its pet 
investment project and to issue more debt, especially if the probability of being removed from 
office is high. With scrapping, there is an extra reason for the current cost of public funds to 
fall short of the expected future cost of funds in the partisan outcome. This introduces an 
additional strategic inefficiency to invest and borrow too much, which may well lower social 
welfare compared with the situation when scrapping is ruled out. The incumbent may 
massively invest in its pet project to dissuade a potential future rival political party from 
investing in its pet investment project. Once re-election is ensured, the incumbent scraps 
substantial part of its own project. 
Second, restrictions on public investment bring the current cost of funds more in line 
with the expected future cost of funds and thus diminish the strategic incentive to borrow too 
much. Investment restrictions therefore raise social welfare, especially if the probability of a 
change in government is high. Under such restrictions any additional resources left for the 
future are no longer channelled into investments that benefit only part of the population, but 
will be transformed into public consumption goods that are valued by everyone. For any 
given level of (future) investment, a restriction thus induces the incumbent to restrain debt 
accumulation, which in turn leads to lower scrap in equilibrium and a more balanced time 
profile of public consumption.  
Third, the political economy outcome with restrictions on public debt dominates the 
unconstrained political economy outcome. The political distortions can thus also be curbed 
with a deficit rule such as the one prescribed by the Stability and Growth Pact of the 
European Union. The optimal restriction on public debt exceeds the planner’s optimal debt 
level, because it needs to make a trade-off between over-investment in the two different 
public investment projects. Although restrictions on public debt are welfare improving, they 
are dominated by the optimal investment restrictions, which are more directly targeted at the 
origins of the distortions. In fact, if scrapping is forbidden, investment restrictions can ensure 
that the socially optimal outcome is attained. 
Fourth, restrictions on public investment or debt are not needed if projects only have 
financial returns, since then the partisan and planner outcomes coincide. 
Our results are obtained in a partial equilibrium framework with exogenous wages 
and interest rates, and a rudimentary private sector. In future work on the potential merits of 
golden rules, investment restrictions and debt restrictions it is important to model private 
behaviour (labour supply, saving, etc.) and extend our results to a general equilibrium setting. 
It would also be important to allow for the effects of government investment on productivity 
and the rate of economic growth along the lines of Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995). Although we expect taxes to adversely affect private saving and labour supply and to   27
increase the marginal cost of public funds, we do not expect that the qualitative nature of our 
conclusions will be much affected. 
It is interesting to investigate how the political economy of public investment projects 
impacts on the optimal budget window (cf., Auerbach, 2004). Governments tend to choose 
public investment projects with immediate benefits over projects with delayed benefits 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). The budget window should therefore not be too 
short, since otherwise the benefits of public investment are not fully taken account of or the 
costs are shifted beyond the window. However, the budget window should not be too long 
either for otherwise it includes future years for which current legislation is meaningless. At 
the same time, budget windows should be designed in such a way to ensure solvency and 
long-term budget commitments. 
 
References 
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990). A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt, 
Review of Economic Studies 57, 3, 403-414. 
Alt, J. and D. Lassen (2005). The political budget cycle is where you can’t see it: transparency 
and fiscal manipulations, Mimeo, Harvard University and EPRU, Copenhagen. 
Auerbach, A.J. (2004). Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 10694, Cambridge, Mass. 
Azzimonti-Renzo, M. (2005). On the dynamic inefficiency of governments, University of 
Iowa. 
Barro, R.J. (1979). On the determination of the public debt, Journal of Political Economy 87, 
5, 940-971. 
Barro, R.J. (1990). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal 
of Political Economy 98, S103-S125. 
Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995). Economic Growth, McGraw Hill, New York. 
Bassetto, M. and T.J. Sargent (2006). Politics and efficiency of separating capital and 
ordinary government budgets, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 1167-1210. 
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and X. Debrun (2004). Reconciling stability and growth: smart pacts and 
structural reforms, IMF Staff Papers 51, 3, 431-456. 
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and X. Debrun (2007). The new Stability and Growth Pact: a first 
assessment, European Economic Review 51, 2, 453-478. 
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and H. Uhlig (1999). An analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
Economic Journal 109, 458, 546-571. 
Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2004). Improving the SGP through a proper accounting of 
public investment, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4220, London.   28
Bohn, H. and R.P. Inman (1996). Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from 
the U.S. states, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45, 13-77. 
Buiter, W.H. (1985). A guide to public sector debt and deficits, Economic Policy 1, 1, 13-79. 
Buiter, W.H. (2003). Ten commandments for a fiscal rule in the E(M)U, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 19, 1, 84-99. 
Buti, M., Martins, J.N. and A. Turrini (2006). From deficits to debt and back: political 
incentives under numerical fiscal rules, Mimeo, European Commission, Brussels. 
Dafflon, B. and S. Rossi (1999). Public accounting fudges towards EMU: a first empirical 
survey and some public choice considerations, Public Choice 101, 59-84. 
Easterly, W. (1999). When is fiscal adjustment an illusion? Economic Policy 28, 55-86. 
Fabrizio, S. and A. Mody (2006). Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline, 
IMF Working Paper, No. 06/123, Washington DC. 
Galí, J. and R. Perotti (2003). Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe, Economic 
Policy 18, 37, 533-572. 
Glazer, A. (1989). Politics and the choice of durability, American Economic Review, 79, 5, 
1207-1213. 
Hallerberg, M. and J. von Hagen (1999). Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and 
budget deficits in the European Union, in J. Poterba and J. von Hagen (eds.), Fiscal 
Institutions and Fiscal Performance, Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
Koen, V. and P. van den Noord (2006). Fiscal gimmickry in Europe: one-off measures and 
creative accounting, forthcoming in P. Wierts et al. (eds.), Fiscal Policy Surveillance 
in Europe, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke. 
Krogstrup, S. and C. Wyplosz (2006). A common pool theory of deficit bias correction, 
Mimeo, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.  
Milesi-Ferretti, G. (2003). Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative 
accounting, Journal of Public Economics 88, 377-394. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G. and K. Moriyama (2004). Fiscal adjustment in EU countries: a balance 
sheet approach, IMF Working Paper, No. 04/134, Washington DC. 
Peletier, B.D., Dur, R.A.J. and O.H. Swank (1999). Voting on the budget deficit: comment, 
American Economic Review 89, 5, 1377-1381. 
Persson, T. and L.E.O. Svensson (1989). Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: 
policy with time-inconsistent preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 2, 
325-345. 
Poterba, J.M. (1995). Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending, Journal of 
Public Economics 56, 165-187. 
Poterba, J.M. and K.S. Rueben (2001). Fiscal news, state budget rules, and tax-exempt bond 
yields, Journal of Urban Economics 50, 3, 537-562.   29
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles, American Economic Review 80, 1, 21-
36. 
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles, Review of 
Economic Studies 55, 1, 1-16. 
Tabellini,G. and A. Alesina (1990). Voting on the budget deficit, American Economic Review 
80, 1, 37-49.  
Turrini, A. (2004). Public investment and the EU fiscal framework, Economic Paper, No. 202, 
DG ECFIN, European Commission, Brussels. 
Velasco, A. (1999). A model of endogenous fiscal deficits and delayed fiscal reforms, in 
Poterba, J. and J. von Hagen (eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, 
Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
Velasco, A. (2000). Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking, Journal of 
Public Economics 76, 1, 105-125. 
Von Hagen, J. and I. Harden (1994). National budget processes and fiscal performance, 
European Economy Reports and Studies 3, 311-418. 
Von Hagen, J. and I. Harden (1995). Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline, 
European Economic Review 39, 3, 771-779. 
Von Hagen, J. and G. Wolff (2005). What do deficits tell us about debts? Empirical evidence 
on creative accounting with fiscal rules, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4759, London. 
Wyplosz, C. (2002). The Stability Pact meets its fate, Mimeo, Graduate Institute for 
International Studies, Geneva.   30
 
Table 1: Apolitical benchmark 
Preferences 
U = u(G1)+ φ [u(G2) + λψ K(I) + (1–λ)ψ φ L(J,I-ςS)] 
       where u′, K′, LJ, LI, LIJ > 0,   u′′, K′′, LJJ, LII < 0  and K(0) = L(0, I–ςS) = 0 
Budget constraint 
First period:              BB1 = G1 + I – R1
Second period:          BB2 = (1+r) B1
B  + G2 + J – R2 – βςS – ρK K(I),   0 < β ≤ 1 
Final period:             (1+r) BB2 = ρL L(J, I-ςS) 
Present value:            G1 + I + φ (G2 + J) = R1 + φ [R2 + ρK K(I) )+βςS] + φ
2 ρL L(J, I-ςS) 
Smoothing of public consumption 
u′(G1U) = u′(G2U) = ηU   ⇒    G1U = G2U = G(ηU) 
Demand for investment in second period (project L) − No scrap: 
[(1–λ) φ ψ + φ ρL ηU] LJ(JU, IU) = ηU            ⇒           
() ++
L J( , , ,ρ ,ψ,λ) UU U JI r η
+ − −−
=  
Scrapping and demand for investment in second period (project L) − With scrap: 
[(1–λ) φ ψ + φ ρL ηU] LI(JU, IU -SU) = ηU β     ⇒       
++ + ++ +
US
LL S( , , ,β ,ρ , ψ , λ )S ( , , β ,ρ , ψ , λ ) UU QQ SI r I r ηη
++ − − + − −
== +
[(1–λ) φ ψ + φ ρL ηU] LJ(JU, IU -SU) = ηU        ⇒     
() ++
US
L J( , , β ,ρ , ψ, λ). Q U Jr η
− − −−
=  
Demand for investment in first period (project K) − No scrap: 




,, , ρ ,ρψ ,λ). I( , UU U J Ir η
+ −− +
=
Demand for investment in first period (project K) − With scrap: 




US ,r,ρρψ ,λ) I( ,,




ς = 0: no scrap, ς = 1: scrap, 
λ = fraction of population in favour of project K, 1–λ = fraction in favour of project L, 
ρ = financial return on public investment, ψ = ideological return on public investment, 
r = interest rate, φ = 1/(1+r) = discount factor, U = utility, u = felicity function, 
B = public debt, G = government consumption, I = investment in project K, 
J = investment in project L, S = investment in K that is scrapped, η = cost of public funds, 
β = scrap value of investment done in project K, R = exogenous government revenue. 
Subscript U denotes the apolitical, utilitarian outcome. 
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Table 2: Political economy of public investment 
Preferences: 
Party P – before election:                                     U = u(G1) + φ [πu(G2P) + (1−π) u(G2Q) + ψ K(I)] 
Parties P and Q, respectively – after election:         u(G2) + ψ K(I)  and  u(G2) + φ ψL(J, I–ςS) 
Budget constraints: 
First period:                              BB1 = G1 + I – R1
Second period party i=P,Q:     BB2 = (1+r) B1
B  + G2i + Ji – R2 – βςSi – ρK K(I),   0 < β ≤ 1 
Final period party i=P,Q:       (1+r) BB2 = ρL L(Ji, I– ςSi) 
Present value i=P,Q:               G1 + I + φ (G2i+ Ji) = R1 + φ [R2 + ρKK(I)+βςSi] + φ
2 ρL L(Ji, I–ςSi) 
AFTER ELECTION 
Demand for public consumption, i=P,Q: u′(G2i) = ηi   ⇒   G2i = G(ηi),  G′=1/u″<0 
Demand for public investment by parties P and Q − No scrap: 
ρLLJ(JP, I) = 1 + r   ⇒       and   (ψ  + ρ
() +
P
L J( ,, ρ ) P JI r
+ −
= LηQ) LJ(JQ, I) = (1 + r) ηQ   ⇒     
() ++
Q
L J( , ,, ρ ,ψ) Q Q JI r η
+ −−
=
Scrapping and demand for public investment by parties P and Q − With scrap: 
ρL LI(JP, I-SP) = (1 + r) β and ρL LJ(JP, I-SP) = 1 + r ⇒   
() ++ +
PS PS
LL S(, β,ρ )  and   J ( ,β ,ρ ) PP SI r J r
− −−
=+ =
(ψ + ρL ηQ) LI(JQ, I–SQ) = ηQ (1+r) β      and     (ψ + ρL ηQ) LJ(JQ, I–SQ) = ηQ (1 + r)    ⇒  
                                   
() ++ + +
QS QS
LL S( ,, β,ρ ,ψ)  and   J ( , , β ,ρ ,ψ) QQ QQ SI r J r ηη
− +− − − −
=+ =
Cost of public funds under parties P and Q − No scrap: 
                          and   
+









Cost of public funds under parties P and Q − With scrap: 
                       and    
+
S
P2 1 K L η (, - ( 1 + r ) ,, β,ρ ,ρ ) P IR B r η








No scrap: UP = u(G1)+φ [πu(G( (I, R P η 2-(1+r)B1, r, ρK, ρL))) + (1–π)u(G( (I, R Q η 2-(1+r)B1, r, ρK, ρL, ψ))) + ψ K(I)] 
Scrap: UP = u(G1)+φ [πu(G( (I, R
S
P η 2-(1+r)B1, r, β, ρK, ρL)))+(1–π)u(G( (I, R
S
Q η 2-(1+r)B1, r, β, ρK, ρL, ψ))) + ψ K(I)] 
Demand for public consumption: u′(G1) = η1   ⇒   G1 = G(η1),  u″<0, G′<0 
Investment by P – No scrap: (πηPρK+ψ)K′+φπηP ρL
P
I L +(1−π)ηQ [ρKK′+(φρL
Q




I L ]ξ= (1+r)η1
Investment by party P – With scrap: (ρK+ψ/η1)K′ + β = 1+r 
Dynamic efficiency debt – No scrap: π ηP + (1−π) ηQ ξ = η1,  ( ) ( )( )
QQ
J η 0 ξ G' / G' ψ/L J QQ Q ηη φ η 1 ⎡ ⎤ < ≡+ ≤ ⎣ ⎦  
Dynamic efficiency debt – With scrap: πηP+(1−π)ηQξ
S= η1 , ( ) ( )( ) ()
SQ
J η I η  0<ξ G' / G' + ψ/L J L S QQ Q ηη φ η
Q S Q Q S 1 ⎡ ⎤ ≡ −≤ ⎣ ⎦  
Notation: π = probability that P wins election. Other notation as in Table 1.   32
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Table 3: Results for planner and bipartisan outcomes 
Utility of government consumption and cost of funds 
u(Gt)=δGt 
1-ε /(1-ε),  ε≠1,   u(Gt)=δln(Gt), ε=1  and ηt=δGt 
−ε
Capital production in projects K and L 
K(I) = I
σ γ
1-σ  and   L(J, I) = J
σ I
θ,   0 < σ+θ < 1 
Base parameters 
ψ=1,    r = δ = 0.2,    λ = π = σ = γ =0.5 
β = θ = 0.4,     ε = 1.5,     R1=R2=2,      ρK = ρL = 0.25 
 
(a) Without scrap: 
  Planner 
   G1      G2         I          J       B1          Ω 
Partisan 
   G1        G2P     G2Q       I         JP        JQ        B1        Ω 
Baseline  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.410   0.017  1.002  0.903  0.398  2.145  0.0200  0.725  1.147   -0.174 
π=1  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.410   0.017  0.958  0.958  0.410
*  2.143  0.0200  0.778
*  1.101  -0.251 
δ=0.25  0.954  0.954  1.436  1.035  0.390  -0.177  1.126  1.013  0.484  1.916  0.0183  0.744  1.042  -0.345 
ε=1.25  0.809  0.809  1.605  1.193  0.414  -0.715  1.007  0.868  0.337  2.170  0.0202  0.758  1.177   -0.908 
r=0.15  0.806  0.806  1.642  1.194  0.449   0.065  0.986  0.889  0.383  2.230  0.0224  0.741  1.215  -0.146 
ρK = 0.5  0.827  0.827  1.752  1.235  0.579   0.067  1.003  0.904  0.390  2.383  0.0217  0.748  1.386  -0.138 
ρL = 0.5  0.800  0.800  1.731  1.411  0.531   0.082  0.998  0.900  0.395  2.206  0.0817  0.992  1.204  -0.0982 
R1=3  0.881  0.881  2.145  1.717  0.026   0.268  1.119  1.013  0.391  2.980  0.0260  0.902  1.099  -0.00322 
R2=3  0.874  0.874  2.050  1.623  0.924   0.227  1.101  0.996  0.392  2.839  0.0250  0.874  1.939  -0.0300 
ψ=0.1  1.962  1.962  0.108  0.026  0.070  -0.512  1.951  1.918  1.848  0.182  0.00277  0.101  0.133  -0.513 
 
(b) With scrap: 
  Planner 
   G1      G2         I          J        S         B1        Ω 
Partisan 
   G1        G2P     G2Q       I           JP        JQ        SP         SQ         B1         Ω 
Baseline  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.000  0.410   0.017  0.717  0.532  0.385   4.214    0.000  0.101   4.214   4.012    2.930  -0.336 
π=1  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.000  0.410   0.017  0.704  0.704  0.407
*  4.007    0.000  0.201
*  4.007  3.605    2.711  -0.284 
β=0.35  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.000  0.410   0.017  0.730  0.537  0.373   3.926    0.000  0.114    3.926  3.664   2.656   -0.350 
ψ=0.1  1.970  1.970  0.173  .0014  0.170  0.143  -0.510  1.827  1.682  1.635   0.861    0.000  0.0335  0.861  0.794   0.688   -0.526 
* These values never materialise as party Q never comes to power if party P is sure to be re-elected. 
They are the values Q would choose as the probability of Q coming to power approaches zero. 
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Table 4: Results under fiscal restrictions 
 
(a) Investment restrictions: No scrap 
  G1        G2P     G2Q       I
R       J
R         B1         Ω 
Optimal restrictions: planner levels  0.836  0.836  0.836  1.574  1.164  0.410    0.017 
 
(b) Investment restrictions: Scrap 
  G1        G2P     G2Q       I
R       J
R         SP      SQ        BB1         Ω 
Investments at planner levels  0.904  1.163  0.753  1.574  1.164  1.491  0.000  0.478  -0.104 
Optimal investment restrictions(I
R*,J
R*)  0.968  1.247  0.806  1.617  0.966  1.546  0.000  0.585  -0.101 
 
(c) Debt restrictions: No scrap 
  G1        G2P      G2Q        I         JP        JQ        B1         Ω 
Debt level at planner levels  0.913  1.739  0.579  1.497   0.0150  1.439  0.410   -0.134 
Optimal debt restriction BB1=
*
1
R B   0.940  1.530  0.535  1.655   0.0162  1.265  0.595   -0.130 
 
(d) Debt restrictions: Scrap 
  G1       G2P     G2Q       I         JP        JQ         SP      SQ      B1
R       Ω 
Debt level at planner level  0.895  2.332  0.577  1.514  0.000  1.444  1.514  0.000  0.410  -0.142 
Optimal debt restriction BB1=
*
1
R B   0.931  2.112  0.512  1.757  0.000  1.180  1.757  0.000  0.688  -0.135 
 
Note: All calculations at baseline parameter values. 
 